Strategic Depth Is a Must by Limor Livnat - Minister of Communications February 6, 1998, Jerusalem Post As threats of Saddam Hussein's Scuds and memories of sealed rooms become palpable once again, it is important that we remember the lessons of the Gulf War, specifically to how they relate to further withdrawals from Judea and Samaria. In its obessive drive to create a sovereign Palestinian Arab state bewteen the Mediterranean an the Jordan, the Left uses the Gulf War to invalidate claims that the hilltops of Judea and Samaria are of strategic importance to Israel's security. Its argument is that in an age of unconventional weaponry, strategic depth is unimportant. The war against Iraq proved this, they claim, because the disputed mountain range lying to the east of the pre-1967 Israel, could not keep the Scuds out. In fact the war proved just the opposite. The 39 missles which fell on our cities and terrorized our population did not compromise our sovereignty. If they had, we would have had no choice but to respond. We did not. Kuwait, on the other hand, was conquered, occupied, and rendered a nonentity in a mere six hours, with tanks and infantry, not with Scuds. To extricate Kuwait from Saddam's stranglehold, the most modern weaponry in the world was insufficient. The US, along with 38 allies, flew 120,000 sorties, dropping over a million bombs in 40 days of high-tech warfare, and yet Saddam was not brought down to his knees. He did not surrender until American troops occupied 40 miles of Iraqi territory. It is ironic, but true that Israel's entire width, including Judea and Samaria, is 40 miles. A second instructive irony is that Kuwait and pre-1967 Israel are equal in square miles. Kuwait, though, is round, while Israel is long and narrow, making it much more vulnerable to attack. The continued importance of territorial depth is not lost on much larger countries with much less to lose than Israel. We know of no superpowers which have disbanded their armies because they have nuclear capability. Similarly, NATO defense strategy is still (even after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact) based on strategic depth. The reason is simple, little has changed. Territory is needed to defend a country, and if too much territory is lost, the war is lost. The Left then points to the US. It is our ally and will never let it happen, it says. The US is a dear friend and does not want Israel to be destroyed. But as Golda Meir once told Richard Nixon when the latter suggested the same, "By the time you get here, we won't be here." Does anyone really believe that there are 38 countries, or even a quarter of that number, who would join together to liberate us, if our fate were that of the Kuwaitis? Would there be any of us left to liberate? Further substantive withdrawal in Judea ans Samaria means greater territorial contiguity for the Palestinian Authority. That was Labor's strategy from the outset of Oslo: the creation of a de facto PLO state through the creation of a contiguous land mass running from Jenin to Gaza via east Jerusalem and three safe passages from Hebron to Gaza. A sovereign Yasser Arafat in Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza means that Ashkelon, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem, will be in range not of Scuds, but Katyushas. This indicates just how irresponsibly delusive the Left's argument that Israel is strong enough to deal with a hostile Palestinian state on its longest border is. What are we going to do if Arafat, or a successor, fires Katyushas at us? Turn Hebron into Hirishima? Obviously we will have no choice but to re-enter the areas at a great cost of life. Some say we must take a calculated risk. But the calculation is wrong and the risk way too big. The goverment's insistence on a smaller percentage, totally linked with compliance, should be intended to prevent contiguity in order to prevent statehood. Because sovereignty is a function of continuity, Arafat is holding out for a larger percentage so he can connect the areas under his control. If Arafat declared a state tomorrow, it would have little meaning. But if the territory under his control was connected, a proclamation of statehood would not even be necessary. It is therefore imperative that any further withdrawal, even if implemented only after full compliance, must not allow for territorial continuity. What was done, was done. The autonomy granted to the large Palestinian Arab population centers is something the Right is going to have to get used to. But what was not done, must not be done. No contiguity was given and no statehood was granted. Ans that is something the Left is going to have to get used to. Blowing the dust off the gas masks and trying them on for size should make that a bit easier to understand.