The illusions of peace and Drano By Ron Dermer July 31, 2003 Enumerating the differences between democratic and nondemocratic societies is not particularly difficult. After all, the consensual government, opposition parties, free press and independent courts of a free society stick out like a sore thumb next to the authoritarianism, one-party rule, state-controlled media and kangaroo courts of societies ruled by nondemocratic regimes. But judging from the statecraft advocated by democratic leaders both inside and outside Israel, an understanding of the policy implications of these differences is hard to find. Treating the nondemocratic states that surround Israel as if they were democracies has burned the Jewish state in both war and peace. For example, the widely held notion that a Palestinian regime not checked by the constraints imposed on a free society would be an asset in Israel's fight against terror has been exposed as fantasy. Yitzhak Rabin's observation that Yasser Arafat would be more effective at fighting terror because he would not have to deal with "a Supreme Court, [human rights organizations] and bleeding-heart liberals" proved as prescient that year as the Nobel Peace Prize committee. We would have been wise to heed the advice of Natan Sharansky, who, even before the ink on the White House lawn was dry, warned us that a society which does not respect the rights of its own citizens will not respect the rights of its neighbors. Drawing on his firsthand knowledge of the inner workings of tyranny, Sharansky understood what few other leaders here do, even today, after 1,000 Israelis have paid the ultimate price for their ignorance: An authoritarian Palestinian regime will act no differently from any authoritarian regime. It will need an external enemy to justify internal repression and maintain its rule. It will use terror and incitement not merely to undermine the foundations of peace, but also to buttress the foundations of its own power. On June 24, 2002, the inane efforts to make peace with Palestinian dictators were supposedly put behind us. President George W. Bush articulated the inextricable link between peace and freedom. The Palestinians would have to build an open, transparent, democratic society in order to win their statehood, because only such a society would keep the peace. The Reaganites and Jacksonites in the Bush administration who had championed the same ideals in their historic and successful confrontation with the Soviet Union had seemingly won the day. For the first time, advancement in the peace process was linked to a change in the nature of Palestinian society. But it was only one day. Little more than a year later, the illusion of peace with strongmen has returned in force. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), like Arafat before him, is the new weakling on the block. Now, like Arafat before him, he is to be strengthened. Only then, we are told - as we were before - will he be able to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. Only then, we are told - as we were before - will he be able to make peace (that he is willing to do either seems to go without saying). Unfortunately for Israel, this nonsensical approach to peacemaking with authoritarian regimes has been joined by a nonsensical approach to fighting wars with them. Here Israel, partly by virtue of its own foolishness, partly by its misplaced fear of undermining relations with America, and partly by its refusal to act as any self-respecting nation would, is wedded to the idea that targeting the population of a nondemocratic state will win it security. We are still foolish enough to believe that by putting Palestinians into a pressure cooker, their leaders will stop their terror campaign against us. They won't. Palestinian authoritarian leaders care as much for their subjects as Saddam Hussein did for his, and as Fidel Castro, Kim Il Jung and the Iranian mullahs do for theirs. As is true of any subjugated population, so long as Palestinians fear their own leaders more than Israel there is no hope of fomenting change from below. Faced with a nondemocratic society in which the pipe for bottom-up political change is clogged, two alternatives will achieve victory. Unclog the pipe - i.e. change the balance of fear among the population - or throw out the kitchen sink - i.e. dismantle the regime that rules them. The former was a policy that worked particularly well for powers of the ancient world when "it takes a village" had a different connotation than it does in present-day America. But now that liberal values and television have made razing towns an unacceptable weapon in the arsenal of democratic states - short, perhaps, of total war when no other options are available and when razing democratic towns becomes a reality - the "throw out the kitchen sink" policy must be pursued if there is to be security against the threats posed by nondemocratic states. Fortunately, the Bush administration understands that to win the war on terror, unclogging pipes is a losing strategy. Two kitchen sinks have already been thrown out, and more may be in the offing. Unfortunately, Israel has not followed suit. As it has done for the past 55 years, the Jewish state continually tries to improve the quality of its Drano - trying counterterrorist raids one day, targeted assassinations the next, imposing closures and curfews, digging trenches, building fences, etc. - with varying degrees of success. But even if the blood spilling out of the sink is drained for a while, the pipes remain clogged; the regime stays in power, and the terrorism and war continue. Only when Israel is ready, willing, and able to throw out its neighbor's sinks will the Jewish state finally have security. And only when those pipes are permanently unclogged will there be any hope for a lasting peace. ---------- The writer is a political consultant who lives in Jerusalem.