An iceberg called peace By Yosef Goell Ha'aretz (December 13) - There's only one good thing about Hafez Assad's agreeing to reopen negotiations: The threat of a competing negotiating track might just induce the Palestinians to speed up their own talks over the division of the West Bank. Everything else is bad. Assad may have been the one to have blinked first, tactically (though we don't know what US President Clinton may have promised him to get him to resume talks with Israel on his terms). But so far, all of Israel's leaders, from Rabin through Peres, Netanyahu, and now Barak, have been the ones to blink first: They acquiesced to Assad's condition that talks be based only on Israel's withdrawal from all of the Golan. It's not that the Golan is sacrosanct as a reasonable, though wrenchingly painful, trade-off for full peace with Syria and the entire Arab world. For that matter, ceding the Palestinian-populated part of Jerusalem, or part of Tel Aviv, all of Bnei Brak, or Barak's hometown of Kochav Yair, would not be too much to surrender either, in exchange for such peace. All these places have much less security significance than the Golan. But then, who needs "security" if one is talking about a "real peace"? That's just the point. In the case of Syria we're not talking of real peace. At best, it's very much less, and much more dangerous, than the chilly nonbelligerency treaty we've had with Egypt for the past 20 years. That agreement is a significant improvement on the 30 years of intermittent and ever-escalating wars, but it is very far from peace. Yet our leaders continue to extol that "peace," even though they have given in to Egypt's determined opposition to honoring the agreed-upon normalization clauses. Those clauses were the basis for gradually turning long-time enemies into peaceful neighbors. In the case of Assad, we're not even making a pretense of talking about real peace. Quibbling about who will man an early-warning station on Mount Hermon and the extent of mutual demilitarization is meaningful only on the assumption that Syria's hostility will continue unabated. If we were talking about meaningful peace we would be demanding that Syria scrap its poison-gas-bearing ground-to-ground missile force, which threatens all of Israel, in exchange for partially giving up a crucial strategic asset like the Golan. Our leaders have blinked first by acquiescing to the contention that Assad's demand for all the Golan is eminently "reasonable," while our equally painful demands on Assad are "unrealistic and unthinkable." Have all our recent leaders - including those of the Labor Party, which spent a generation assuring the country that giving up the Golan would be suicidal - gone mad? No. They are "merely" giving in to American pressure and to American blandishments of multibillion dollar substitutes for the strategic advantages of the Golan, which are to be sacrificed even in the context of continued Syrian hostility. The US is thus one of the major arenas in which the threat to the Golan and to Israel must be fought. There is no better time to pick such a fight with the misguided leaders of our most steadfast supporter than in the midst of an American election year. Such a fight must center around the fatuousness and danger of negotiating with an Assad who is not only a Saddam Hussein-type tyrant, but also one of the world's leading abettors of the drug trade and of anti-Israel and anti-American terrorism. At home, too, there is a very good chance of defeating the defeatism of our leaders. Monthly public opinion polls since the Oslo Agreement of September 1993 have shown that while a significant majority of the Israeli public supports a territorial compromise with the Palestinians, a similar majority has consistently opposed giving up any part of the Golan in exchange for a spurious "peace" with Syria. So, in the referendum to which Barak is committed, there is more than an even chance of defeating any agreement with Syria for giving up all (or even a large part of) the Golan. And if public opinion polls indicate there is a good chance of Barak's losing the referendum, it will stiffen his resolve not to give in to Assad's demands. But the opposition to giving up the Golan must be country-wide. And the opponents must be careful not to alienate others by resorting to the boomerang of violent demonstrations.